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Grace, Freedom and the Expression of Emotion:  
Schiller and the Critique of Kant 
Christopher Bennett 
 
 
In this paper I ask what Schiller can tell us about expressive action, specifically the 
expression of emotion. 6FKLOOHU¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIHPRWLRQWDNHVSODFH
in the context of his arguments for the importance of grace, a value he thinks 
QHJOHFWHGE\.DQW¶VZULWLQJVRQHWKLFV*UDFHLVVRPHWLPHVWKRXJKWRIDVPRUDO
beauty, and its interest specifically aesthetic as opposed to ethical.1 For this reason 
6FKLOOHU¶VFRQFHUQVDUHVRPHWLPHVUHJDUGHGDVSHULSKHUDOWRWKHPDLQEXVLQHVVRI
moral and political philosophy. However, I will argue that what is at stake in 
6FKLOOHU¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIJUDFHLVUDWKHUWKe nature of freedom and the development of a 
distinctive model of human perfection.  
 7KHH[SUHVVLRQVRIHPRWLRQWKDWKHOSWRFRQVWLWXWHJUDFHRQ6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZ
are not merely physiological changes that accompany emotion; neither are we to 
XQGHUVWDQGµH[SUHVVLRQRIHPRWLRQ¶LQWKHZD\WKDWODWHUSKLORVRSKHUVDQGDUWLVWV
would see this as relating to the nature of art - at least not in the first instance (there 
will be a connection with the nature of art to be explored further on).2 Rather, we are 
concerned here with expressions of emotion that are gestures. We can think of these 
DVEHLQJOLNHWKHµDUDWLRQDODFWLRQV¶GLVFXVVHGE\5RVDOLQG+XUVWKRXVHIRULQVWDQFH
MXPSLQJIRUMR\KLWWLQJWKHWDEOHLQDQJHUUXIIOLQJDFKLOG¶VKDLURXWRIDIIHFWLRQ
hugginJDGHDGEHORYHG¶VFORWKHVLQJULHI± in other words the gamut of what we call 
µDFWLRQRXWRIHPRWLRQ¶3 The characteristic of such action, we might say, is that it is 
voluntary, intentional action (unlike blushing or crying) through which the presence 
of the emotion is manifested; where the intention, however, is not to express the 
emotion; but where the fact that the emotion is manifested has some formative 
influence on the resultant action. Another way of putting the point, close to 
+XUVWKRXVH¶VFKDUDFWHrization, is that the action is voluntary, but does not seem to be 
directed at a further end (even an end such as displaying or communicating or venting 
the emotion) ± rather, the action is expressive. That is why it seems appropriate to 
explain it as haviQJEHHQGRQHµRXWRIHPRWLRQ¶UDWKHUWKDQZLWKVRPHIXUWKHUHQGLQ
mind.  
 I will argue that Schiller notices that actions like this pose a problem for what 
KHWDNHVWREHDQDWWUDFWLYH.DQWLDQFRQFHSWLRQRIIUHHGRP,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWKH
solves the problem. But his wrestling with it is instructive. We could put the point like 
this. Either we act freely when acting out of emotion, or we do not. If we do not act 
freely, it looks as though we must take ourselves to be literally overpowered by 
emotion. But this does not seem to be correct ± many actions out of emotion, as 
Hursthouse points out, are controlled and intentional actions. Therefore, we might be 
pushed to view action out of emotion as free action. But if free then, on the Kantian 
view, this can only be because action out of emotion is responsive to laws of reason 
that govern the action in question. So, how can we see action out of emotion as 
governed by rational laws? Two possibilities suggest themselves. Either action out of 
emotion is subsumed under the already-accepted Kantian principles of practical 
reason ± so, for instance, the way we act when we act out of emotion is governed by 
principles such as universalizability and nothing more ± or else we have to admit 
further principles of practical reason governing the expression of emotion in 
particular. Kantians may be tempted to take the first line ± but this may simply add to 
the impression that they cannot explain the rationality of action from emotion. The 
second response, by contrast, will lead us to a kind of rationalist phenomenology of 
the emotions, on which emotions bear a strong relation to judgements and other 
cognitive attitudes, and which we might see as running through Franz Brentano and 
Max Scheler, to Charles Taylor and Martha Nussbaum YLD$QWKRQ\.HQQ\¶VAction, 
Emotion and Will.4 The key claims of this view would be something like this: that 
justificatory reasons do, in principle, govern emotions and emotional behavior; that 
this is in part because emotions are complex states with rich intentional content, and 
emotional behaviour bears some intelligible relation to that content; that these reasons 
may, indeed, be central to morality; and that, because these reasons are specific to the 
realm of the emotions, the emotions would be our medium for discovering such 
reasons.  
 Schiller does not take this second path. But he does stand at a pivotal point in 
its history. For he accepts that action out of emotion cannot be explained simply 
mechanistically, and accepts the Kantian conception of freedom as spontaneity; but he 
breaks new ground in asking how that view ± of spontaneous action as action 
responsive to principles of practical reason ± is to be reconciled with the fact that 
sometimes we act expressively, out of emotion. The ideal of grace is an ideal where 
we act expressively yet freely. If grace requires something of us in regards to the 
emRWLRQVZHIHHODQGWKHZD\ZHH[SUHVVWKHPWKHQIURP6FKLOOHU¶VSRLQWRIYLHZ
this means that only with certain expressive tendencies can we be truly free. 
 The central topic of the paper, then, is the expression of emotion, but in order 
to explain the dLVWLQFWLYHQHVVRI6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZZHPXVWILUVWH[SODLQZKDWLVDt stake 
in it. Thus in section 1 ,JLYHDQLQWURGXFWLRQWR6FKLOOHU¶VPRUDOSV\FKRORJ\
emphasizing his concern with freedom and, because of that, the distinctive model of 
human perfection that he introduces. This model of freedom and perfection is 
examined in more detail in section 2DQG6FKLOOHU¶VWKHRU\RIEHDXW\LQDUWLV
introduced to help explain it; in section 3 I look at the range of theoretical possibilities 
for analyzinJ6FKLOOHU¶Vmodel. In section 4, I GHIHQGWKHYLHZWKDW6FKLOOHU¶VPRGHOLV
a model of expressive action; and section 5 asks what we can learn from Schiller 
about the study of emotion and its expression. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1$QLQWURGXFWLRQWR6FKLOOHU¶VPRUDOSV\chology 
In this chapter ,ZLOOFRQFHQWUDWHRQ6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZVDVH[SUHVVHGLQWKHKallias 
Letters, his essay On Grace and Dignity, and his Letters on the Aesthetic Education of 
Man (Aesthetic Letters).5 6FKLOOHU¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOZULWLQJVUHYHDODFRQFHUQZLWKD
QXPEHURIUHODWHGWKHPHV,QWKLVVHFWLRQ,JLYHDVXUYH\RIVRPHRI6FKLOOHU¶V
characteristic concerns and positions.  
 First of all, Schiller is concerned with the nature of freedom. He takes it that 
IUHHGRPLVERWKRQWKHRQHKDQGDNH\YDOXHWREHUHDOL]HGLQDSHUVRQ¶VOLIHDQGLQ
political society, and on the other a basic and defining feature of human agency. In a 
OHWWHUWRKLVIULHQG.|UQHUKHVD\Vµ&HUWDLQO\QRJUHDWHUZRUGVKDYHHYHUEeen spoken 
by a mortal human being than these Kantian ones, which at the same time are the 
FRQWHQWRIKLVZKROHSKLORVRSK\GHWHUPLQH\RXUVHOI¶6 Thus Schiller seems to agree 
with the Kantian belief in the possibility of spontaneity, as much as he agrees with 
.DQW¶VDWWDFKPHQWWRWKHQRELOLW\RIWKHOLIHLQZKLFKZHJLYHVODZVWRRXUVHOYHVUDWKHU
WKDQUHFHLYLQJWKHPSDVVLYHO\IURPRXWVLGH6FKLOOHU¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIIUHHGRPDSSHDUV
to change through his life7 ± for instance, there is a conception of freedom as 
liberation from social rules celebrated in his early play The Robbers, which it might 
be thought that the older Schiller came to reject. But the attempt to define and capture 
the importance of freedom, particularly in opposition to Kant, seems to have been an 
abiding concern. 
 Secondly, Schiller follows Kant in accepting an important link between our 
freedom and our capacity for rational thought and agency. He recognizes that this 
implies a distinction between those aspects of the self that are capable of rational 
thought and directly controllable by it, and those that are not. This explains his 
recognition of some distinction or split between reason and materiality.  
 However, and this is the third general theme, Schiller rejects what he sees as 
the Kantian approach of treating these distinctions in too rigid a way. He is 
concerned, on the one hand, with a range of issues to do with the emotions, taste, the 
non-arbitrariness of sensible and not merely rational or intellectual responses to the 
world, and the nature and appreciation of artWKHYHU\SRVVLELOLW\RIVXFKµHGXFDWHG¶
RUµILQH¶ sensibility; and its role in the good human life and society. And on the other 
hand, he is concerned about the effect on the quality of human life of seeing ourselves 
as definitively split in such a way. We can briefly point to two aspects of this concern. 
Firstly, Schiller is concerned about the very fact of fragmentation within the 
individual psyche ± as displayed for instance in his concerns about the effects of 
specialization in modern society in the famous seventh of the Aesthetic Letters.8 And 
secondly, he is worried, as we will see, that where there are two intractably distinct 
faculties, the only way forward is for one to dominate the other. This suggests that 
Schiller is concerned, not just with harmonious integration of the elements of the 
psyche, but also that each should have space to develop in its own way, undominated 
by force external to itself. Only thus, Schiller will suggest, can the human being as a 
whole be free. 
 Schiller, therefore, is interested in the way in which the apparent split between 
reason and sensibility, which we seem forced to accept if we are to explain how and 
to what extent human beings can subject their behaviour to standards that they could 
endorse on reflection, can be overcome in certain respects in order to allow for the 
possibility of harmonious and all-round human development and adequate sensible 
responses to morality and the arts. His way of thinking about this tends to emphasise, 
not that the Kantian dichotomies are illusory, or that it is only at a superficial initial 
level of analysis that reason and sensibility are truly distinct (as later thinkers in the 
Idealist or Romantic traditions would claim),9 but rather that there is greater scope for 
co-operation between the two sides than Kant recognizes. But whether or not we 
regard that solution as sufficient, it is clear that Schiller is responsible for raising 
important questions that those following him have also wanted to ask about Kantian 
HWKLFV)RURQHWKLQJZHFDQVHHLQQRYDWLRQVVXFKDVKLVFRQFHSWLRQRIWKHµSOD\-GULYH¶
in the Aesthetic Letters, which consists in a proper balance between reason and 
sensibility, as an early version of the concept of unity-in-difference (or the unity of 
unity and multiplicity) that would play such an important role in the later history of 
German philosophy.10 We can also see his thinking as playing an important role in the 
development of ideas of freedom and perfection, perhaps making Schiller the first to 
DWWHPSWWRGHYHORSZKDW'RXJODV0RJJDFKKDVFDOOHGDµSRVW-Kantian 
SHUIHFWLRQLVP¶11 
 
26FKLOOHU¶VPRGHORIIUHHGRP 
$V,KDYHPHQWLRQHG6FKLOOHU¶VDWWHPSWWRRYHUFRPHWKHRSSRVLWLRQEHWZHHQUHDVRQ
and sensibility involves a commitment to the possibility of unity-in-difference (or the 
µXQLW\RIXQLW\DQGPXOWLSOLFLW\¶DQGKLVZD\RIWKLQNLQJDERXWWKLVSRVVLELOLW\
involves thinking of the differentiated elements as having a certain nature that causes 
them to behave in potentially conflicting ways, but where this nature is in some way 
malleable rather than fixed and intractable, and hence open to creative 
transformation.12 )UHGHULFN%HLVHUKDVSRLQWHGRXWWKDW6FKLOOHU¶VDPELWLRQIRUWKLV
reconciliation of opposites in unity is exhibited, not just in his moral psychology, but 
also in his thinking about political arrangements, and in his thinking about the nature 
of beauty in the work of art.13 %HLVHUWKLQNVWKDWWKHUHLVFRQWLQXLW\EHWZHHQ6FKLOOHU¶V
views on these topics, and that some apparently peculiar claims that Schiller put 
forward, can be made more intelligible when seen in the light of his early writings.  
 ,Qµ*UDFHDQG'LJQLW\¶WKHSV\FKRORJLFDOUHFRQFLOLDWLRQLVLOOXVWUDWHGE\
means of a political analogy. One type of political arrangement comes about when a 
ruler imposes his will on his subjects in opposition to their inclinations. Another type 
comes about when the subjects impose their will on the ruler. Both of these are 
unsatisfactory: the one dictatorial; the other disordered and anarchic. The latter is 
formless; the former has form but it is harsh and imposed against the will of the 
populace. But a third possibility is that type of liberal government under which, 
although ruled over by the will of some particular ruler, each FLWL]HQµFDQVWLOO
persuade himself that he is living according to his own lights and simply following his 
LQFOLQDWLRQV¶14 Here, the idea is, there is form that does not do violence to its material, 
EXWUDWKHUDSSHDUVWRDULVHVSRQWDQHRXVO\2QWKHµUHSXEOLFDQ¶UHDGLQJRI6FKLOOHUWKLV
in turn requires that citizens have acquired certain virtues.15 7KLVLV6FKLOOHU¶VPRGHO
for the rule of reason over sensibility: it is at its best where sensibility appears to be 
following its own course yet nevertheless does the bidding of reason:  
Humans either suppress the demands of their sensuous nature in order to have 
a proper relation to the higher demands of their rational nature; or they reverse 
WKLVDQGVXEMXJDWHWKHUDWLRQDOSDUWRIWKHLUEHLQJWRWKHVHQVXRXV« or the 
impulses of the sensuous settle into harmony with the rules of the rational and 
human beings are at one with themselves.16 
 It is perhaps hard to know how to unpack this metaphor. But the basic idea is 
that, not only our rational nature, but also the matter/particular/content side of things, 
has a claim that has to be respected; that in some way things are better for a human 
being, or perhaps the human being herself is better, when this claim is respected; and 
that the highest form of being is therefore one in which harmony between the two 
sides of human nature is achieved.17  
 1RZWKLVLVQRWMXVW6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZRIEHDXW\RUKXPDQSHUIHFWLRQRUWKH
fulfillment of human nature; it is also his view of freedom, properly conceived. His 
idea is that freedom must be freedom of the whole person; and therefore that a being 
whose rational nature must coerce and suppress its sensible side cannot be fully free. 
6FKLOOHULVWKHUHIRUHRIIHULQJDQLQWHUQDOFULWLTXHRI.DQW¶VDSSURDFKWRHWKLFV.DQW¶V
conception of autonomy, he takes it, requires only that reason should be unimpeded 
by sensibility in its determination of the will; specific states of sensibility are at best 
irrelevant to autonomy.18 6FKLOOHU¶VFODLPE\FRQWUDVWLVWKDWZHDUHQRWWUXO\free if 
our rational will is simply imposed on sensibility; it is only when sensibility is 
somehow respected and integrated that we are free. Since the human being as a whole 
combines reason and sensibility, the mere imposition of the demands of reason on 
sensibility PXVWEHH[SHULHQFHGDVEUXWHFRQVWUDLQWE\VRPHDVSHFWRIRQH¶VEHLQJ19 
%XWIUHHGRP6FKLOOHUUHDVRQVPXVWEHLQFUHDVHGZKHQRQH¶VEHLQJLVXQGHUOHVV
constraint. Therefore freedom must be greater when two conditions are met: firstly, 
RQH¶VDFWLRQDQGFKDUDFWHUDUHVXFKWKDWRQHEHKDYHVUDWLRQDOO\ZLWKRXWRQH¶V
sensibility stopping one from doing so; and secondly, at the same time in behaving as 
reason requires one does not leave sensibility unsatisfied. For genuine freedom to 
arise some integration is necessary whereby an agent can satisfy sensibility through, 
or at least concurrently with, following the demands of reason. The problem of 
fragmentation is not simply the aesthetic one that we fail to be beautiful when there is 
no harmony. And neither is it (simply) that when we fail to achieve harmony we fall 
short of human perfection. Rather Schiller is concerned with the ways in which 
internal fragmentation and division make us unfree by restricting the free 
development of one or other central aspect of the self.  
 However, Schiller is concerned not only with the internal psychological 
structure of freedom, but also its external appearance. It is for this reason that 
6FKLOOHU¶VFKRLFHRIWKHWHUPµJUDFH¶LVQRWDUELWUDU\DQGQHLWKHUGRHVLWLPSO\D
concern with the purely aesthetic intruding into his account of moral behaviour.20 
Schiller takes it that there is a deep connection between freedom, beauty and 
perfection.21 As we will see in more detail further on, he thinks that when one behaves 
in such a way as to be truly free ± LQWKHVHQVHWKDWRQH¶VVHQVLELOLW\LVXQFRQVWUDLQHG
and appears to satisfy its own demands yet conforms to morality ± one appears as 
EHDXWLIXO2QHZLOODSSHDUDVJUDFHIXORUEHDXWLIXOLQDVSHFLILFUHVSHFWZKHQRQH¶V
actions effortlessly rather than unwillingly comply with morality.  
 Furthermore, although I have argued that Schiller is concerned with freedom 
rather than perfection, a more adequate way of putting it might be that, for Schiller, 
true freedom requires a certain kind of perfection. For Schiller, freedom requires that 
neither side of human nature should impose constraint on the other; it involves, in 
other words, an arrangement in which each side should be allowed space for the full 
development of its demands, while at the same time, the integration of these demands 
with those of the other side. This is a version of the thought that human perfection 
involves the full development but also the LQWHJUDWLRQRIDKXPDQEHLQJ¶VIDFXOWLHV
and powers: in this case, there are basically two powers, each with its own 
developmental potential or trajectory; the two powers are potentially conflicting; but 
when both fully realize themselves yet also cohere, there is the perfection of what, in 
the Aesthetic Letters6FKLOOHUFDOOVµSOD\¶$QGWKDWFDQEHWKRXJKWRIDVDGLVWLQFWLYH
conception of perfection.22 It is not a view of human perfection on the model of a pre-
existing blueprint that appropriately trained inquirers can cognize, apply to their own 
case and hence realize in their own person. Rather the Schillerian model makes 
central a certain type of internal relation between the different parts according to 
which unity can be achieved, a unity that does not require us to posit a pre-existing 
model of perfection accessible to cognition. However, the model cannot be wholly 
formal either. This is because both reason and sensibility must be understood as 
having a certain content or developmental trajectory, such that certain forms of 
imposition by the other side of the person will amount to a distortion or unfulfilment 
or transgression of the demands of the oppressed side. In other words, for Schiller to 
be able to claim that the Kantian model of autonomy is compatible with sensibility 
being merely coerced or (less metaphorically) frustrated it must be the case that 
sensibility has an inner tendency towards certain determinate kinds of satisfactions. 
7KXV6FKLOOHU¶VSHUIHFWLRQLVPHPSKDVL]HVDIRUPDODUUDQJHPHQWRISDUWVEXWLW
requires that these parts have a content of their own in order to make meaningful his 
requirement that the other side should not interfere with the development of that 
content. 
 
3. Beauty as the appearance of freedom 
We can get a better idea of what this model of freedom involves by looking at 
6FKLOOHU¶VHDUO\ZULWLQJVRQWKHQDWXUHRIWKHEHDXWLIXOZRUNRIDUW,QWKHVHHarly 
writings similar concerns about the relation between freedom, perfection (or beauty), 
form and content are in evidence. And this will also give us a chance to address a 
concern that might have arisen about the model as explained so far. The concern 
comes in the form of a dilemma. Certainly, it might be said, it can be understood that 
practical reason has its requirements, and that sensibility has its own inner tendencies. 
But the most plausible way in which the tendencies of sensibility should be 
understood makes it hard to see how the two sides can be reconciled. Desires and 
emotions have natural ends ± food, sex, warmth, reputation, perhaps ± but 
unconstrained by reason and will they lead away from morality and impartial concern 
for others. The only way out of this is to build moral motivation into sensibility in the 
first place. But then it is unclear whether we can really talk about sensibility having 
WKHVHPRWLYDWLRQVDVDQLQQHUWHQGHQF\6FKLOOHU¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKLVGLOHPPDLV
complex, and we will look at it in more detail as we go through. Indeed, there is a 
question whether he has a satisfying response to this dilemma. But as mentioned 
above, his response has to be to see the content of both reason and sensibility as not 
fixed and intractable but capable of mutual adjustment. This is what is suggested in 
his model of freedom in the artwork. 
 /HWXVWXUQWKHQWR6FKLOOHU¶VFUXFLDOFODLPWKDWIUHHGRPLVQRWMXVWDXWRQRP\
but µheautonomy,¶ as this idea is developed in relation to artworks in the Kallias 
Letters. +HDXWRQRP\6FKLOOHUFODLPVLVWKHµLQQHUSULQFLSOHRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRID
thing, which can be at the same time seen as the ground of its form: the inner 
necessity of form¶23 The idea, as we will develop it below, is that the principles of 
form relevant for a certain being are not merely laws stemming from the nature of that 
thing, as (he thinks) they would be in autonomy; rather, they are at the same time 
freely given, such that the being is freely complying with the demands of its own 
nature.24 Let us explore this complex idea in more detail. 
 First of all, it will come as a surprise to many readers that we look to artworks 
to discover what Schiller thinks about freedom; so this requires some initial 
explanation. In this early set of letters to his friend Körner, Schiller aims to provide an 
³REMHFWLYHFULWHULRQRIEHDXW\´)RU6FKLOOHUWKLVFULWHULRQLV³IUHHGRPLQDSSHDUDQFH´
what is beautiful is such because it appears (as it happens, illusorily) to be free or, 
crucially, self-determining.25 Furthermore, the structure of self-determination that 
Schiller ascribes to the artwork is similar in some respects to that exhibited by the 
self-determining human agent, particularly in the aspect of reconciling two apparently 
irreconcilable opposites: form and matter (or reason and sensibility).  
 ,QEULHISDUDSKUDVH6FKLOOHU¶VDUJXPHQWVHHPVWRJRVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKLV$Q
artifact is such that it normally draws attention to the purpose for which it is made. In 
6FKLOOHU¶VWHUPVWKLVPHDQVWKDWLWDSSHDUVWRXVDVKDYLQJEHHQGHWHUPLQHGµIURPWKH
RXWVLGH¶± that is, according to a purpose or rule extrinsic to itself. This is not to say 
that it cannot exhibit a kind of perfection. A house or a chair may be perfectly suited 
to its function. In this case, it perfectly complies with the rule for a thing of that type. 
%XWLWLVQRWEHDXWLIXOE\YLUWXHRIWKDWSHUIHFWLRQ6FKLOOHU¶VGLDJQRVLVRIWKLVLVWKDW
beauty only arises when the object appears, not merely to have had a certain form 
given to it (from outside, by a maker, according to a certain further end), however 
perfectly, but rather to somehow be freely adapting itself to that form.26 %HDXW\LVµWKH
LQQHUQHFHVVLW\RIIRUP¶DQGDULVHVZKHQWKHREMHFWQRWRQO\SHUIHFWO\REH\VRU
conforms to a rule, but appears to have given the rule to itself.27 As with his account 
of freedom in human nature, the material of which the artwork is made has its own 
tendencies and claims that have to be respected. Nevertheless, in the case of the 
artwork, the freedom in question is only a matter of effect or appearance: the artwork 
LVQRWIUHHHYHQLQWKHQRXPHQDOUHDOP$QDUWZRUNLVDOZD\VFUHDWHGµIURPWKH
RXWVLGH¶E\DPDNHUZKRKDVFHUWDLQPRWLYDWLRQVDQGLVDELGLQJE\DPRUHRUOHVV
determinate conception of the thing being made.28 Thus although in some sense we 
DOZD\VNQRZWKHDUWZRUN¶VRULJLQVEHDXW\LVDFKLHYHGZKHQLWLVFUHDWHGLQVXFKD
way that we do not attend to those origins, and thus it compellingly appears self-
GHWHUPLQLQJµWKXVDIRUPDSSHDUVDVIUHHDVVRRQDVwe are neither able nor inclined 
WRVHDUFKIRULWVJURXQGRXWVLGHLW¶29   
 This might all seem hopelessly metaphorical, but an example might help to 
illustrate the point: 
A landscape is beautifully composed if all of the particular parts out of which 
it is constituted play along together so well that they set their own limitations, 
and the whole becomes the result of the freedom of the particular parts. 
Everything in a landscape must refer to the whole and yet the particular should 
only be constrained by its own rule, should only seem to follow its own will. 
But it is impossible that the process of cohering to a whole should not require 
some sacrifices on the part of the particular, since a collision of freedoms is 
XQDYRLGDEOH«)UHHGRPFRPHVDERXWEHFDXVHHach restricts its inner freedom 
such as to allow every other to express its freedom. A tree in the foreground 
might cover a nice spot in the background; to require of the tree that it not do 
this would come to close to its freedom and would reveal dilettantism. What 
does the able artist do? He allows that branch of the tree which threatened to 
cover the background to sink down under its own weight and thus freely make 
place for the view behind it; thus the tree fulfils the will of the artist by 
following its own.30 
Thus a successful artwork must achieve some arrangement of the whole, an 
arrangement that will be determined in part by the nature of the medium, the rules of 
the genre, etc. Furthermore, when we look at the individual components of the work, 
such as the tree, again there is a sense in which they are as they are to serve the 
overall purposes of the work. But to be successful these rules should not constrain the 
work of art; rather the work in its very nature should seem to need precisely those 
rules and precisely that medium. Thus the tree which needs to allow the view behind 
it to be seen must be portrayed as sinking down under its own weight.  
 However we judge its success as an aesthetic theory,31 6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZLV
LQWULJXLQJ,WLVSUHVXPDEO\WKLVYLHZWKDWLVLQWKHEDFNJURXQGRI6FKLOOHU¶VFODLPRU
rather assumption) that the appearance of genuine freedom in human behavior ± as 
grace ± will necessarily appear beautiful to us. One of the theoretical attractions of the 
view as a theory of beauty is perhaps that it is in large part a formal conception of 
beauty. Though, as discussed above in relation to human perfection, it requires the 
parts to have some content of their own, this substantive aspHFWLVVPDOO)RU6FKLOOHU¶V
model dictates nothing about what the content or claims of the individual elements 
should be; it simply requires that there should be such content, and that perfection in 
life and art arises when the claims associated with such content can be made 
compossible. 
 ,ZLOODUJXHWKDW6FKLOOHU¶VPRVWGLUHFWDQGSURPLVLQJDFFRXQWRIZKDWVXFK
reconciliation between form and matter would look like when applied to human 
psychology comes in the case of the expression of emotion. The category of emotion 
is itself hard to disentangle into cognitive and non-cognitive elements, and rather 
seems to be a synthesis of the two. Schiller is aware of this, and argues that it is in 
emotion and its expression that reason and sensibility can be seen as cooperating. 
Indeed, as I suggested at the outset, we can see Schiller as looking at the phenomenon 
of the expression of emotion and arguing that this phenomenon is hard to do justice to 
on the Kantian assumption that reason and sensibility are radically at odds. But a 
FRUROODU\RIWKLVRQ6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZLVWKDWLWLVLQDQGWKURXJKRXUFDSDFLW\IRU
emotion that we are enabled to achieve the balance between reason and sensibility 
without which the two sides of our nature would merely be at war. Emotion is 
WKHUHIRUHDFUXFLDOPHGLDWLQJFDWHJRU\RQ6FKLOOHU¶Vaccount. The question, however, 
is what sort of mediation this represents. Before we look at his analysis in detail, we 
will look in the next section at the range of theoretical possibilities. 
 
4. On reconciling reason and sensibility: some possibilities 
When the mind expresses itself in the sensuous nature that depends on it [in 
der von ihm abhängenden sinnlichen Natur] in such a way that nature 
faithfully carries out the will of the mind and expresses its sentiments clearly, 
without contravening the demands that the senses make on them as 
appearances, then there will arise what we call grace. However, one would be 
equally far from calling it grace if either the mind were to reveal itself forcibly 
in the sensuous or if the expression of the mind were missing from the free 
effect of the sensuous. For in the first case there would be no beauty present 
and in the second it would not be the beauty of play.32  
6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZKHUHVHHPVWREHWKDWWKHUHFDQbe expressions of the mind that take 
SODFHLQWKHµIUHHSOD\RIWKHVHQVXRXV¶%HIRUHZHORRNDWWKLVYLHZLQPRUHGHWDLOLQ
the following section, it will be useful to put it in the context of a range of competing 
views of how reason and sensibility might interact and harmonise.  
 The central axis on which these views differ is the extent to which, and the 
means by which, sensibility can be responsive to reason. The first would be a 
conception of instrumental reason: here sensibility is unresponsive to reason, but 
reason can harmonise with desire because the only job reason has is to seek means to 
the satisfaction of desires. In an expansive view, instrumental reason might also have 
the job of ordering less fundamental desires according to more fundamental desires, 
KRZHYHU³IXQGDPHQWDO´LVWREHXQGHUVWRRG7KLVPLJKWHQGXSDVVRPHKDYHDUJXHG
giving a close approximation to a more rationalistic account of the will. But however 
plausible this line might be, we will not pursue it here, since it is clear that Schiller 
subscribes to a more substantial account of the authority of reason. 
 Secondly, then, we might instead have a view on which reason and desire 
harmonise because reason can understand the ends proper to a human being, and can 
approve of the extent to which desires have been trained to pursue those ends. On the 
(Aristotelian) view I am imagining,33 the desires and emotions themselves are non-
cognitive as on the instrumental conception, but are more malleable and trainable, and 
there are rational standards that they have to meet such as some objective standards of 
flourishing or appropriateness. Reason can recognize these standards and hence 
approve of the desires which have been brought indirectly into line with those 
standards, for instance through their cultivation in a good upbringing.  
 A third form of harmonization would come about where there is a desire to do 
DVUHDVRQGHPDQGV7KLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVVXJJHVWHGE\6FKLOOHU¶VFODLPLQµ*UDFHDQG
'LJQLW\¶WKDWYLUWXHFRQVLVWVLQDQµLQFOLQDWion IRUGXW\¶.34 In other words, the virtuous 
person is in a state of harmony because or insofar as her desires cohere with her most 
fundamental desire, and her most fundamental desire is to do her duty, whatever that 
turns out to be. Some may think that such an inclination would be a strange one to 
have. The claim has been put forward by Bernard Williams and Michael Smith that 
moral desires tend to be for particular ends, such as the welfare of this particular 
SHUVRQUDWKHUWKDQIRUµZKDWLVULJKWEHFDXVHLW LVULJKW¶35 On the other hand, 
however, perhaps it does not seem so implausible that a person might have a desire to 
act rightly on the basis of some recognition of the importance of right. But putting the 
matter this way leads us to see that there are two ways of thinking about this position. 
The way I just put it is that the desire arises as a result of some rational apprehension 
of desirability. Otherwise put, the inclination is responsive to reason or intellectual 
apprehension. That is one way of thinking about the possibility of harmony between 
reason and sensibility: that at least some aspects of sensibility are as they are because 
of our grasp of considerations that are accessible to reason.36 On the other hand, the 
second way of understanding this view would be to think of the inclination for duty as 
simply a desire that is hard-wired into us alongside desires for food, warmth, sex and 
so on. This position would perhaps look strange; one might be drawn to it if, however, 
one thinks that reason and sensibility are quite distinct faculties and that sensibility 
cannot properly be said to be capable of being informed by reason.  
 Therefore one might have the view that there are forms of sensibility like an 
inclination for duty, and then think either that the inclinations themselves are 
cognitive, and responsive to the authority or majesty of duty, or one might have the 
view that they are non-cognitive and merely coincide with duty. 
 7KHYLHZTXRWHGDWWKHVWDUWRIWKLVVHFWLRQZLWKLWVWDONRIWKHµH[SUHVVion of 
WKHPLQGLQWKHVHQVXRXVQDWXUHWKDWGHSHQGVRQLW¶VHHPVWRHQYLVDJHDPRUHLQWLPDWH
connection between reason and sensibility than any of those views that see sensibility 
as non-cognitive. However, it also seems to gesture towards something more than just 
DQµLQFOLQDWLRQIRUGXW\¶KRZHYHUWKDWVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRG,QGHHGif one accepts 
that reason can inform, shape and perhaps initiate forms of sensibility such as an 
inclination for duty then perhaps there is no principled reason why one should not 
accept other forms of interaction between reason and sensibility. At any rate one 
would need to make controversial meta-ethical assumptions to explain why only duty 
can be the object of those cognitive emotions whose existence one has accepted. 
Otherwise, by allowing at least one inclination that depends for its nature on existence 
on the way its object is cognized, one has opened the doors to a wide range of 
cognitive emotions and desires in which sensibility is responsive to and capable of 
being directly shaped by cognitive considerations ± that is, considerations that can 
FRPHXSLQDVXEMHFW¶VGHOLEHUDWLRQVDQGPD\FRQWLQXHWRappear authoritative on 
UHIOHFWLRQ+HQFHLIWKLVLV6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZWKHQSHUKDSVZHFRXOGVHHKLPDVDQHDUly 
proponent of something like that cognitivist tradition of the emotions, mentioned 
earlier, that runs through Brentano to Nussbaum. 
 That this possibility is envisaged by Schiller is, however, denied by Stephen 
Houlgate in a recent paper.37 Houlgate argues that, for Schiller: 
Human actions are beautiful when our sensible nature is not under the direct 
control of our free reason, but when it accords independently and 
autonomously with the demands of our free reason. Beauty in human action 
thus consists in the harmonious coordination and cooperation of two quite 
distinct autonomies: the autonomy of our sensuous nature and the autonomy of 
our free, moral reason. Neither directs the other, but each follows (or appears 
to follow) its own law. Yet the two fit together harmoniously as in an 
³DUDEHVTXHO\FRPSRVHG(QJOLVKGDQFH38 
$QG+RXOJDWHTXRWHV6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZIURPWKHKallias Letters, that the image of the 
dance captures most aptly his image of the cooperation of the two faculties in action: 
Everything has been arranged such that the first has already made room for the 
second before he arrives, everything comes together so skillfully and yet so 
artlessly that both seem merely to be following their own mind and still never 
get in the way of the other. Thus is the most fitting picture of maintained 
person freedom and the spared freedom of the other.39 
On this picture of their relationship, reason and sensibility interact with one another to 
the limited extent of setting limits to one another, and cooperate freely with one 
another in producing action (though how exactly this process is envisaged is pretty 
mysterious). But what is not taken as a possibility here is that sensibility might 
DFWXDOO\EHGLUHFWO\UHVSRQVLYHWRWKHGHPDQGVRIUHDVRQµ:KDWLVQHYHUFRnsidered¶
Houlgate claims, is precisely what I want to say that Schiller does recognize and go 
some way to developing: µthat free reason might actually manifest, express or embody 
itself directly in the realm of the senses¶40 This passage is quoted, as Houlgate 
acknowledges, from an early work. But although he recognizes that later works may 
be more complex and subtle, Houlgate thinks that Schiller could never significantly 
assent to this genuinely expressive view. The culprit, he WKLQNVLVWKDWµIRUDOO his 
VXEWOHW\6FKLOOHU¶VWKRXJKWUHPDLQLQWKUDOOWR.DQW¶VGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQUHDVRQDQG
VHQVLELOLW\¶LPSODXVLEO\VHHLQJWKHWZRVLGHVDVDXWRQRPRXVSDUWLHVWKDWPXVWOHDUQWR
cooperate rather than two aspects of a higher unity. However, as we will now see, I 
think that we can find precisely that expressive view in µOn *UDFHDQG'LJQLW\¶ 
 
5. Schiller on emotion and expression 
:HDUHQRZUHDG\WRORRNLQPRUHGHWDLODW6FKLOOHU¶VFODLPVDERXWHPRWLRQDQGLWV
role in the reconciliation of opposites in moral psychology. The reason I would like to 
ORRNDWµ*UDFHDQG'LJQLW\¶LQSDUWLFXODULVWKDWKHUHZHILQGDGHWDLOHGPRGHORIKRw 
reason and sensibility might cooperate rather than merely dominate one another in 
KXPDQEHKDYLRU7KHPRGHOLVµGUDZQIURPOLIH¶RUJLYHQLQH[DPSOHVUDWKHUWKDQ
based on the sometimes ponderous metaphysical psychology unveiled in the Aesthetic 
Letters. I will suggest that the account given here shows that Schiller clearly 
envisages genuinely expressive action. However, it is also true that many aspects of 
6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZGRVHHPSUHPLVHGRQWDNLQJWKH.DQWLDQGLFKRWRP\IRUJUDQWHGZKLOH
at the same time criticizing it.41 Perhaps we can say that Schiller at least glimpsed the 
possibility of a psychology that would definitively surpass the Kantian dichotomy, 
though its full theoretical elaboration would have to wait for a later generation of 
thinkers.42 
 Schiller begins his analysis by identifying grace as a type of beauty. This 
seems plausible: graceful action is to be pleasing to the eye. Is it all beauty, or all 
personal beauty? No, Schiller says, for there are many sorts of beauty. In particular, 
we need to distinguish grace from what he calls architectonic beauty, which is the 
beauty of a person considered as a natural being: sheer beauty. Grace (or 
gracefulness?), on the other hand, is beauty associated with a certain sort of 
movement. However, grace is not associated with purely natural, instinctive or 
compulsive movements, Schiller says: it is associated with movements that are 
voluntary or chosen, hence intentional. It is not associated with movement that is 
purely intentional or calculated, though: there must be some mixture of sentiment in 
the cause of the action. Schiller seems therefore to have in mind that category of 
movements that are on the one hand under our voluntary control in the way that mere 
reflexes are not, but on the other hand are caused by emotion, and are spontaneous in 
the sense of not being the result of cold calculation ± what we have called expressive 
actions. However, now Schiller draws a crucial distinction, arguing that grace is 
associated with emotional expression in which it is the rational and not merely the 
natural being that acts: 
Grace, then, can only be attributed to [voluntary] movements and only to those 
that are an expression of moral sentiments. Movements that have no other 
source than sensuality, despite their [voluntariness], still only belong to nature, 
which cannot of its own accord ever arrive at grace. If desire or instinct could 
be expressed as grace, then grace would no longer be capable or worthy of 
human expression. 43 
Such movements are therefore either, on the one hand, voluntary, intentional and 
purposive; or on the other hand they can occur:  
ZLWKRXWWKHSHUVRQ¶VZLOOLQJIROORZLQJDODZRIQHFHVVLW\± but at the behest 
of a sentiment [Empfindung]; these I call sympathetic movements. Although 
the latter are instinctive [unwillkührlich] and based in sentiment 
[Empfindung], one ought not to confuse them with those determined by 
feelings [sinnliche Gefühlvermögen] and natural instinct [Naturtrieb], since 
natural instinct is not a free principle, and what it brings about is not an action 
by the person.44   
Grace is therefore a property of µsympathetic movements.¶ Sympathetic movements 
can be understood as expressions of sentiments or attitudes, but this is distinct from 
the outpouring of natural drives. Rather, expressive actions are genuinely free actions, 
but are not directed at a purpose in the way that most free actions are.45 Hence 
6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZLVWKDWJUDFHLVVSHFLILFDOO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHH[SUHVVLRQRIHPRWLRQ
that is also a product of free rationality, presumably acting under conditions of 
VSRQWDQHLW\³*UDFHLVDOZD\VRQO\EHDXW\RIWKHSK\VLTXHWKDWfreedom sets in 
motion, and movements that simply belong to nature DUHQRWZRUWK\RIWKHQDPH´.46 
 The result of this is that some emotions and the behavior that expresses them 
can be thought of as the product of free agency. An agent need not be thought of as 
merely determined by nature in performing the actions that constitute such 
expression. Yet actions that constitute free, spontaneous, unimpeded expressions of 
emotion also seem to be actions in which sensibility is given free play. Therefore the 
fact that Schiller chooses this category of action suggests that he has a view of 
emotion as a good example of the interaction between reason and sensibility.  
 This seems to show that for Schiller, expressive action is more than just the 
cooperation or coincidence of reason and sensibility. The claim that non-natural 
sentiments are expressed in such action would appear to give at least a causal role to 
UHDVRQRQWKHUHDGLQJRIµH[SUHVVLRQ¶RQZKLFKVRPHWKLQJ¶VEHLQJH[SUHVVHGLVDVLJQ
RILWVSUHVHQFH2QDPRUHDPELWLRXVUHDGLQJRIµH[SUHVVLRQ¶IXUWKHUPRUHWKHPLQG¶V
expressing itself in sensuous nature would involve the? mind, not merely causing, but 
actively shaping, giving form to, the sensuous matter of expressive activity. Schiller 
here clearly seems to want to go beyond the view represented in the passage on the 
(QJOLVKGDQFH,QWKLVSDVVDJHIURPµ*UDFHDQG'LJQLW\¶ for instance, the mind is 
visible in the expression of emotion: 
When people speak, we see their gaze, their facial features, their hands, often 
their whole body speaking at the same time and the mimetic part of the 
conversation is frequently considered the most eloquent.47 
This passage seems precisely to envisage the mind being present or embodied in the 
sensuous. We might, to be sure, question whether Schiller has the theoretical 
wherewithal to articulate or develop the idea that reason or cognitive states can be 
embodied in expressive behavior. For instance, he lacks the idea that expressive 
behavior can have meaning, that it can symbolize or refer to the content of cognitive 
states; and he lacks the idea that behavior might form a symbolic system in which 
such reference could take place. Perhaps it takes these elements to be in place before 
we can fully understand how reason and sensibility might satisfactorily be related. But 
GHVSLWHWKLV,ZRXOGDUJXHWKDW6FKLOOHU¶VFRQFHSWLRQcan be seen as a pivotal point in 
the development of the idea of expressive behavior as free behaviour.48  
 
5. What does Schiller teach us about the expression of emotion? 
If we now return to the question that opens this paper ± what Schiller can tell us about 
expressive action, and in particular the expression of emotion ± we are now in a 
position to provide some answers. First of all, Schiller provides a defence of the 
emotional life. His defence seems to be conditional, in the respect that it takes as its 
starting point the fact that we are embodied, sensible beings. Given this starting point, 
KRZHYHU6FKLOOHUDUJXHVWKDWWKHRQO\ZD\WREHIUHHLVWRHQGRUVHRQH¶VHPRWLRQDO
side and to cultivate it. Otherwise one will achieve rationality only at the cost of 
frustration. In the Aesthetic Letters, he takes this further, arguing that lack of 
emotionality also leads to a loss of contact with the world. There are two ways in 
ZKLFKWKHKXPDQEHLQJPLJKWµPLVVKLVGHVWLQ\¶6FKLOOHUFODLPVWKHUHRQHWKURXJKD
preponderance of immediate sense, the other through a preponderance of universal 
rationality. (In this latter discussion, Schiller talks of sensibility as the faculty of 
receptivity more generally.) While human beings can never do away with receptivity 
altogether, they can develop or repress it; and Schiller argues that an insufficiency of 
such receptivity or openness leads an agent to respond to the world with rationalistic 
prejudice rather than open-hearted honesty and generosity. The cultivation of 
sensibility ± as well as its subjection to rational thought ± emerges as an attractive 
ideal for human nature: 
The more facets his Receptivity develops [ausbildet], the more labile it is, and 
the more surface it presents to phenomena, so much more world does man 
apprehend, and all the more potentialities does he develop in himself. The 
more power and depth the Personality achieves, and the more freedom reason 
attains, so much more world does man comprehend, and all the more form 
does he create outside of himself. His education will therefore consist, firstly, 
in procuring for the receptive faculty the most manifold contacts with the 
world, and within the purview of feeling, intensifying passivity to the utmost; 
secondly, in securing for the determining faculty the highest degree of 
independence from the receptive, and, within the purview of reason, 
intensifying activity to the utmost. Where both these aptitudes are conjoined, 
man will combine the greatest fullness of existence with the highest autonomy 
[Selbständigkeit] and freedom, and instead of losing himself to the world, will 
rather draw the latter into himself in all its infinitude of phenomena, and 
subject it to the unity of his reason.49  
Secondly, through thinking about the possibility of expressive action as free action, 
Schiller begins to make a distinction between emotions that are merely instinctive 
natural feelings, and emotions in the experience of which we are present as free, 
thinking beings. When it comes to the latter, emotions are not simply brute sensations 
triggered by events but intelligent responses to those events. With this move, Schiller 
takes us into the realm of the adequacy or appropriateness of such responses. One way 
to talk about the fittingness or appropriateness of emotional responses is to see 
emotions as reflecting a pre-existing normative structure in reality. Schiller, however, 
provides a sketch of an alternative. For him, appropriateness in emotion would not 
consist in representing the normative features already present in the situation; rather, 
appropriateness would be a formal feature. Emotion would be appropriate (or perhaps 
warranted) where a non-alienated harmony between the claims of sensibility and the 
FODLPVRIUHDVRQFRXOGEHDFKLHYHGZKHUHRQH¶VLQWHOOHFWXDOJUDVSRIWKHVLWXDWLRQDQG
RQH¶VHPRWional Gestalt or sense of rightness support and reinforce one another.50 
This criterion of appropriateness, to be plausible, would have to be fairly robust ± for 
instance, it would have to be the case, for an emotion to be appropriate or warranted, 
that one could not easily be led into a state of disharmony or alienation by the 
presentation of new evidence, or a change of mood. But there is a distinctive position 
here that is worth thinking through. 
 Thirdly, the claim that reason and sensibility are perfectly balanced only in 
DSSURSULDWHHPRWLRQPDNHVVHQVHRI6FKLOOHU¶VRWKHUwise confusing approach to the 
notion of grace. As those already familiar with Schiller will have noted, his essay is 
FRQFHUQHGQRWMXVWZLWKµJUDFH¶EXWZLWKµGLJQLW\¶$WKRUQ\TXHVWLRQIRU6FKLOOHU
interpretation has been what to make of the relation between the two: this is thorny 
because, having attacked Kant in no uncertain terms for overlooking the possibility of 
grace, Schiller follows his discussion of grace with a much more Kantian-sounding 
GLVFXVVLRQRIGLJQLW\ZKHUHGLJQLW\LVµSHDFHLQVXIIHULQJ¶VSHFLILFDOO\WKHVXIIHULQJ
born of inappropriate natural desires and emotions.51 µ&RQWURORILPSXOVHVWKURXJK
moral strength is spiritual freedom, and its expression in appearance is called 
GLJQLW\¶52 This has confused many readers, since it appears tKDW6FKLOOHU¶VHPSKDVLV
on grace is precisely to suggest that human beings can have an attitude to their 
inclination that goes beyond mere self-control; whereas in the second half of his essay 
he seems to revert to the Kantian view that such self-control is precisely the best that 
we can realistically hope for.  
 +RZHYHUWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQSUHVHQWHGKHUHRI6FKLOOHU¶VSXUSRVHVLQ
highlighting the graceful expression of emotion can, I think, be made compatible with 
WKLV6FKLOOHU¶VYLHZVHHPVWREHWKDWZLth respect to (perhaps many, even most) 
individual instances of emotion and its expression, human beings are capable of 
grace, where emotion is experienced as free and appropriate. However, he can also 
recognize that the nature of emotion is such that human beings will be highly unlikely 
ever to perfectly align emotion and reason, and hence will always also stand prey to 
impulses that are experienced as rationally ungovernable and uncultivable. The only 
thing to do when those impulses fail to align with morality is to have dignity: to 
suppress them and endure them with equanimity as far as possible. Hence both grace 
and dignity are fundamental virtues of the embodied but imperfect human condition. 
 On this interpretation, Schiller leaves it open to what extent our nature can be 
FXOWLYDWHGDQGEURXJKWZLWKLQWKHUHDOPRIUHDVRQKLVWDONRIWKHµEHDXWLIXOVRXO¶
whose temperament is a perfect harmony of reason and sensibility, captures the 
structure of episodes of human existence rather than a providing an attainable model 
for life as a whole. +RZHYHUIURPWKHSRLQWRIYLHZRI6FKLOOHU¶VDUJXPHQWZLWK.DQW
even the existence of episodes of action where cognitive attitudes are expressed in 
sensibility is enough to show that Kantian psychology is in trouble. Human beings are 
capable of appropriate emotion, emotion that will express itself in grace; and this fact 
needs to be accounted for in our moral psychologyVRPHWKLQJWKDW.DQW¶VDFFRXQW
FDQQRWGR%XWWKHLGHDRIDOLIHLQZKLFKDOORQH¶VHPRWLRQVDUHDSSURpriate is 
something human beings, because of the ungovernable nature of parts of their 
embodiment, cannot expect to achieve.  
µ>7@KLV beauty of character [grace], the ripest fruit of humanity, is only an idea 
that they can vigilantly strive to live up to, yet, despite all efforts, can never 
IXOO\DWWDLQ¶53  
This interpretation accounts for the fact that Schiller, in discussing grace, writes as 
though he is pointing out a basic and familiar fact of human existence ± albeit one that 
has not been sufficiently acknowledged in theory ± namely that reason and sensibility 
align in at least some expressive behavior, while in discussing dignity seems to treat 
the life of grace as an unattainable ideal.  
 )RXUWKO\6FKLOOHUUDLVHVDQLQWHUHVWLQJTXHVWLRQDERXWWKHµFODLPVRI
VHQVLELOLW\¶WKDWQHHGWREHVDWLVILHGDWWKHVDPHWLPHDVWKHFODLPVRIUHDVRQLIZHDUH
WREHIXOO\IUHH6FKLOOHU¶VSRLQWseems to be to recognize that, as embodied agents 
with susceptibility to pleasure and pain and other feelings, we are subject to felt states 
that have satisfaction-conditions, and where satisfaction brings a kind of pleasure and 
dissatisfaction a cost of some felt pain. Earlier I considered a dilemma for Schiller, 
ZKLFKVWDWHGWKDWWKHPRUHSODXVLEOHRQH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHVDWLVIDFWLRQRIVXFK
embodied states, the more difficult it would be to see that satisfaction being 
responsive to morality. As I said, SchLOOHU¶VUHVSRQVHLVWRWDNHWKHYLHZWKDW
sensibility is more malleable than the criticism allows. In section 4 we saw that 
Schiller seems to have the view that sensible states are responsive to the demands of 
reason; it is not simply that they happen to coincide with the demands of reason, but 
that they have the satisfaction-conditions they do because of the shaping influence of 
reason. With the brief discussion of dignity, we have now seen that Schiller is 
doubtful whether all states of sensibility can be so shaped. But perhaps that is a 
plausible position, and recognizes the extent to which the supposed dilemma does get 
at something important.   
 
Conclusion 
,QWKLVSDSHU,KDYHLQYHVWLJDWHG6FKLOOHU¶VFRQFHUQZLWKIUHHGRPDQGLWVEHDULQJRQ
his contribution to our thinking about emotion and its expression. I have claimed that 
Schiller thinks of freedom as requiring a kind of internal structural perfection that 
mirrors his conception of the interaction between form and matter in the beautiful 
work of art. And I have argued that it is in grace, or the fitting expression of emotion, 
that he gives the most convincing picture of what the joint freedom of reason and 
sensibility might look like at the level of human psychology. I have also considered 
some criticisPVRI6FKLOOHU¶VSURMHFWDQGVKRZQKRZDOWKRXJKWKDWSURMHFWLV
avowedly incomplete, it may have the resources to answer them. 
 In closing, I would like to offer what I think is a more telling criticism of 
6FKLOOHU¶VSURJUDPPH. The malleability of sensibility is not the only way to reach 
reconciliation between reason and sensibility. One might think that reason would also 
have to be malleable, and not present itself as an intractable opposite to sensibility. 
However, if this is right then it seems that a limiting criterion for the validity or 
rational appropriateness of some moral standard, for Schiller, would have to be its 
possibility of being the object of appropriate emotion for a human being. If this 
limiting criterion were not in place then it would be at least possible, depending on 
the content of morality, that there could be moral standards our compliance with 
which could never be achieved by someone possessing perfect grace. However, if on 
the other hand this limiting criterion were in place then it would mean that moral 
standards were hostage to the contingencies of the psychology of human agents: the 
content of moral standards would be constrained by the extent to which acting in that 
ZD\FDQµIHHOULJKW¶WRXVJLYHQRur emotional make-up. This is something accepted, 
IRULQVWDQFHE\'DYLG:LJJLQVLQKLVµVHQVLEOHVXEMHFWLYLVP¶ 54 but it conflicts with 
6FKLOOHU¶VKantian FODLPWKDWWKHGHPDQGVRIWKHVHQVXRXVDUHµFRPSOHWHO\UHMHFWHGLQ
the sphere of pure reason and PRUDOOHJLVODWLRQ¶DQGWKDWµWKHSDUWSOD\HGE\
inclination demonstrates nothing about the purely dutiful nature oIWKHDFWLRQ¶.55 
Alternatively, then, perhaps Schiller does intend to argue that dignity is necessary, not 
only because of the ungovernable nature of our natural inclinations, but also because 
of the inhuman nature of some moral obligations, the binding nature of which is 
unaffected by the fact that no human being could comply with them gracefully. 
Which view is more Schillerian is not something we can resolve in this paper. But if 
the claims of this paper are correct, it does raise a central issue for Schiller 
interpretation.56 
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